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We provide a normative analysis of endogenous student and worker mobility in the presence 
of diverging interests between universities and governments. Student mobility generates a 
university competition effect which induces them to overinvest in education, whereas worker 
mobility generates a free-rider effect for governments, who are not willing to subsidize the 
education of agents who will work abroad. At equilibrium, the free-rider effect always 
dominates the competition effect, resulting in underinvestment in human capital and 
overinvestment in research. This inefficiency can be corrected if a transnational transfer for 
mobile students is implemented. With endogenous income taxation, we show that the strength 
of fiscal competition increases with human capital production. Consequently, supranational 
policies aimed at promoting teaching quality reduce tax revenues at the expense of research. 
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November 2010 1 Introduction
In the last decade, student mobility has become an inescapable phenomenon, both for universities
and policy makers. While for the year 2001, the world counted around 2 millions mobile students,
this ￿gure has increased up to 3.3 millions in 2009.1 This phenomenon has increased competition
between institutions of higher education, and has also important policy implications. Indeed, in
the global economy, skilled labor has also become increasingly mobile, so that providers of higher
education do not necessarily reap its bene￿ts at the national level. This gives rise to a potential
problem of free-riding from public entities providing funding to universities. A crucial question in
this context is that of the net impact of both student and worker mobility on university funding
and higher education quality and research production.
This paper provides a normative analysis of endogenous student and worker mobility in the
presence of diverging interests between universities and governments. Students are heterogenous
in ability and in their bene￿ts from studying abroad. Universities produce human capital and
research, and compete in quality so as to attract students. Governments ￿nance universities in
order to maximize national output, based on research and skilled labor. In autarky, universities
and governments have the same objective, which is to maximize a weighted sum of research and
human capital. When student mobility is introduced, universities face a larger market and have
incentives to raise their teaching quality. Another type of mobility to be accounted for in this
context is that of workers. With the addition of worker mobility, the objectives of universities and
governments diverge. Whereas the former focus the human capital they produce independently of
where this human capital locates later, governments care about the stock of human capital which
settles on their territory to contribute to the nation￿ s economy. Therefore, worker mobility creates
a free-riding e⁄ect for governments, which are not inclined to fund universities for o⁄ering teaching
to students who will eventually leave the country.
We provide a theory of public funding of higher education institutions in the context of both
student and worker mobility. In addition to this twofold mobility, our contribution explicitely
accounts for the fact that governments and universities act as distinct agents pursuing their own
and potentially con￿ ictual objective. The motivation behind this approach is that the competition
e⁄ect pertaining to student mobility directly a⁄ects universities￿behavior, whereas worker mobility
a⁄ects governments￿incentives, yielding the free-rider e⁄ect. The former e⁄ect tends to increase the
amount of resources that universities allocate to teaching, while the latter e⁄ect goes in opposite
direction via a reduction of the funding per student received by universities. We show that the
combination of government and university competitions produces a clear prediction about the net
impact of student and worker mobility on the university￿ s funding scheme. In the conxtext of ￿xed
public budgets for higher education, this scheme, which consists in insu¢ cient subsidies per student
1Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2010). Education at a Glance 2010. Paris: OECD
2and excessive lumpsum subsidies to universities, incites universities to underprovide human capital
and produce too much research compared to the socially desirable allocation. In other words, the
free rider e⁄ect is shown to dominate the competition e⁄ect, at the expense of education quality.
This adverse e⁄ect of worker mobility can be mitigated if a transnational entity could enforce
transfers between government for mobile students. When taxes are introduced, worker mobility
and public budgets become endogenous. In this case, policies aimed at raising teaching quality
strengthen ￿scal competition for skilled labor, reducing public budgets at the expense of research.
1.1 Mobility and the competition and free-riding e⁄ects
Two important and opposite e⁄ects of mobility on the incentives faced by higher education providers
and governements are salient in the literature.
On the one hand, following the increase in student mobility, universities tend to engage in quality
competition in order to attract mobile students. This e⁄ect is known as the competition e⁄ect and
has been highlighted in a large variety of models in combination with admission standards (del Rey
(2001)), tuition fees (Kemnitz (2005), Demange et al. (2008b), Lange (2009)) and multicultural
skills (Mechtenberg & Strausz (2008)) among other.
On the other hand, worker mobility has adverse e⁄ects on the incentives of governments to
subsidize higher education. Free-riding is widely acknowledged in this context (Justman & Thisse
(1997); Justman & Thisse (2000); Poutvaara (2004); Kemnitz (2005); Chevalier & Gerard (2008);
Demange et al. (2008b); Demange et al. (2008a); Mechtenberg & Strausz (2008); Lange (2009)).
Recent contributions have attempted to assess the combined impact of both the free-riding
and the competition e⁄ects on higher education quality (Kemnitz (2005); Demange et al. (2008b);
Mechtenberg & Strausz (2008); Lange (2009)). Demange et al. (2008b) highlight that, in a ￿scal
competition context, free-riding can be attributed to worker mobility while competition is driven
by student mobility. In this sense, they argue that the Bologna process can help the latter e⁄ect to
balance the former. The Bologna process is also an important motivation of Mechtenberg & Strausz
(2008), which is one of the closest contribution to ours. In Mechtenberg & Strausz (2008), higher
education is publicly provided, but unlike our model, the government directly makes the decision
regarding the teaching quality o⁄ered. The extent of student mobility is de￿ned by a threshold on the
minimal ability of prospective students required to study abroad. The Bologna process for instance
is considered to lower this threshold, increasing the potential number of mobile students. The
government maximizes social welfare, accounting for externalities generated by foreign students who
settle in the country as workers. The magnitude of this externality is the driving force determining
the net e⁄ect in the tradeo⁄ between competition and free-riding e⁄ects. When externalities from
mobility are low, teaching quality is decreasing with mobility. In this case, free-riding dominates
the competition e⁄ect and quality is suboptimal. With intermediate externalities, quality is non-
monotonic in mobility and has an inverted-U shape: high mobility yields underinvestment, whereas
3low mobility yields overinvestment. Finally, with large externalities, the inverted-U shape remains,
but overinvestment prevails, unless no mobility is permitted at all. The result that a higher mobility
can weaken the competition e⁄ect and thereby reduce quality is somewhat counterintuitive. This
result is due to what they call the composition e⁄ect, which stems from the assumption that
increased mobility always comes at the cost of a lower average quality of students. This reduction
in average ability in turn reduces the magnitude of the competition e⁄ect, leading to a decrease
in quality. This assumption is not made in our model ; instead we assume that all students are
capable of studying abroad, but only those with su¢ cient multicultural skills will do so.2 Summing
up, our model di⁄ers from that of Mechtenberg & Strausz (2008) in the following dimensions. We
consider governments and universities as distinct entities, governments face a budget constraint
(further with endogenous taxes, which also leads to endogeneous worker mobility), and universities
produce both human capital and research. The ￿rst distinction between both models is already
su¢ cient to produce a major di⁄erence in our results. Indeed, the fact that governments and
universities are distinct entities, and that governements act as the principals of universities implies
that the free-riding e⁄ect faced by governments always dominates the competition e⁄ect faced by
universities.
Let us raise two additional points pertaining to mobility and education quality.
First, the education quality actually depends neither on student nor on worker mobility alone,
but rather on the net ￿ ow between the two, namely the rate of return migration (Justman & Thisse
(1997); Justman & Thisse (2000); Lange (2009); Demange & Fenge (2010)). More precisely, the rate
of return migration is the main determinant of the magnitude of the free-riding e⁄ect (Justman &
Thisse (1997); Justman & Thisse (2000)). As a correcting policy, some authors suggest to implement
a system of monetary transfers between countries (or regions) depending either on migration ￿ ows
(Justman & Thisse (1997); Justman & Thisse (2000)), or on student￿ s mobility alone (Chevalier &
Gerard (2008)). This paper gives new insights in this respect by providing a description of (1) how
the public good characteristic of higher education depends on student and worker mobility ￿ ows
and of (2) the way international transfers should depend on those two ￿ ows.
Second, there is often a tradeo⁄in the allocation of public funds between teaching and research.
In the line of del Rey (2001), we analyze the impact of mobility both in terms of teaching and research
under two alternative assumptions: ￿rst under exogenous budget and, second, under endogenous
budget and tax competition.
Our model produces the following results. In autarky, given that the university and the gov-
ernment have the same objective, the university￿ s teaching quality is e¢ cient and is independent
of the government￿ s funding scheme. In the open economy with student and worker mobility, we
distinguish several cases which we compare to the ￿rst best allocation. We ￿rst consider the case
2While this does not qualitatively alter our results, this approach allows us to focus on the main driving forces at
work in the context under study.
4of a single supranational entity which would dictate the funding scheme of both universities, in
order to focus on the university competition e⁄ect while preventing the governments￿free-riding
problem. The Nash equilibrium between universities shows that the teaching quality of one uni-
versity is increasing in its own funding per student, and decreasing in that of the other university.
The non-cooperative equilibrium reaches the ￿rst best allocation in this case since we show that
the single public entity is able to design and implement an appropriate funding scheme to regu-
late competition. We then introduce government competition, and show that the free-rider e⁄ect
dominates the university competition e⁄ect. This results in underinvestment in teaching quality
and overinvestment in research. This ine¢ ciency can be solved if a supranational entity imposes
a positive transfer between governments for each mobile student. Finally, worker mobility and
government budgets are made endogenous by the introduction of a tax on skilled workers. The
transnational transfer can maintain e¢ ciency in education, but ￿scal competition is strengthened
by human capital production, which eventually threatens public budgets at the expense of research.
2 The model, the case of autarky
We start by introducing the simple case of autarky as a benchmark.3 The country has a population
of agents of unit size. Agents, who are unskilled, are heterogenous in ability a ￿ U [0;1]. Ability is a
complement of the education quality q provided by the university in the human capital production
function. Incomes, which directly depend on the agent￿ s level of human capital, are noted y = aq
after graduation, while unskilled wages are normalized to 0.4 Higher education is supplied by
a monopolistic public university and is free for students.5 This university chooses the level of
education quality q so as to maximize the following objective:6
U = H + ￿R;
where H and R are the stock of human capital produced and the amount of money devoted to
research, respectively. The parameter ￿ captures both the returns to the money invested in research
and the university￿ s marginal rate of substitution between human capital and research. The human
capital produced by the university depends on the agents￿decisions to enrol, and on the ability
levels of those who choose to do so. The government provides the university with public funds, in
3We will then introduce a second country and student mobility in the next section.
4This set of assumptions has been used by many authors, including Mechtenberg & Strausz (2008).
5Along with the previous assumptions on ability and wages, free education implies that all agents are willing to
enroll in university. This assumption could be relaxed to render the model more realistic by various means. For
example, extending the support of a to negative values would imply that a ￿xed fraction of the population would
never invest in higher education. Such a modi￿cation would not alter our results.
6We adopt the speci￿cation of del Rey (2001) which clearly highlights the tradeo⁄ between teaching and research
in the allocation of funds in a tractable way.
5the form of a ￿xed component G and a subsidy per student g. These subsidies must be such that
the government￿ s budget B is balanced:
B = G + ng; (1)
where n is the number of students enrolled at university.7 The university￿ s research budget can
then be written as
R = G + gn ￿ T;





The government￿ s objective, ￿, is a function of research and the human capital which settles on its
soil, noted W. In autarky, W is equivalent to H, the human capital produced by the university.10
￿ = W + ￿R:
For simplicity and coherence, the weight parameter ￿ is identical to that of the university.11
We start by analyzing the ￿rst best, and then analyze the non-cooperative allocation, which is
characterized in autarky by a basic principal-agent model.
2.1 The ￿rst best
In the ￿rst best, the planner maximizes ￿ with respect to q.
7In this basic version, B is ￿xed. We relax this assumption by introducing taxation in Section 3.5.
8This simple technology implies that teaching costs depend on the teaching quality independently of the number
of students. Since teaching costs occur at the expense of research, it may be fair to consider these costs as time
spent by academic sta⁄ not doing research. From this viewpoint, the time spent by the teacher to prepare courses in
terms of content and pedagogy, the number of students in the classroom does not have such an important impact on
teaching quality at university. Accounting for the number of students is feasible at the non cooperative equilibrium,
but complicates considerably the ￿rst best analysis. Furthermore, it is clear from Mechtenberg & Strausz (2008) that
convex quality costs are required to obtain interior solutions, whereas this is not the case with costs per students.
9The absence of costs per student, along with the distributional assumption on student ability implies that it is
socially desirable that the whole population enrolls in university. Again, this assumption can easily be relaxed.
10This will cease to be the case in the open economy. Indeed, on the one hand, universities care about prestige,
which is represented by the human capital they produce independently of where it will locate in the future. On the
other hand, governments care about the human capital which will locate on their soil.
11One could argue that a natural objective for the government would be to maximize the national output strictly
speaking. However, on the one hand, it is reasonable to assume that both research and aggregate human capital are
factors of the production function of the national economy and so, this expression could be interpreted as a production
function. On the other hand, since the aim of the paper is to highlight the impact of diverging interests between
universities and governments, it is more convincing to use a speci￿cation as similar as possible between entities, with
a single and plausible di⁄erence pertaining to human capital, either produced by the university, or settling on the
government￿ s soil.
6Proposition 1 The ￿rst best allocation in autarky writes qFB = 1
2￿c.
Proof. Due to the teaching cost function and the distribution of student ability, full participation

































As previously mentioned, the fact the lower bound is zero only implies that the model focuses
on potentially skilled agents, more precisely, agents for which it is socially desirable to invest in
human capital. The model could easily allow for the presence of unskilled agents in the population,
for example by extending the support of a to negative values.
2.2 The non-cooperative equilibrium
In the non-cooperative game, there are three types of players, namely the government, the university
and the agents, who play sequentially. The timing of the game is the following. First, the government
de￿nes a funding scheme (G;g) for the university. Second, the university sets a teaching quality q.
Third, unskilled agents choose to study or not.
Proposition 2 In autarky, the non-cooperative allocation is the same as the ￿rst best and is inde-
pendent of the government￿ s behavior.
Proof. We solve the game by backward induction.
We therefore analyze unskilled agents￿decisions to enrol at university or not. Agents decide to
enroll if aq > 0, which is the case for all agents. In this simple version of the model, the whole
population is willing to enroll at university (n = 1).12 The stock of human capital produced by the








12As already mentioned, this simpli￿cation can easily be relaxed to allow for the existence of unskilled agents in
the population. Also note that while the number of skilled agents is ￿xed, their level of human capital is endogenous.


















In this basic framework, given that the university and the government have the same objective,
and that education investments are e¢ cient for all agents, the university￿ s optimal q is the same
as the ￿rst best level and is independent of the government￿ s funding scheme fG;gg. Education
quality q￿ is decreasing in the cost parameter c and in the preference for research ￿, as expected.
Let us now study the case of the open economy, which implies student and worker mobility.
The consequences of mobility on the non-cooperative equilibrium are twofold. On the one hand,
the level of competition for attracting students increases. National universities become competitors
in a larger market for higher education. On the other hand, governments of di⁄erent countries are
now involved in the de￿nition of education policies. More precisely, under mobility and competition,
universities￿strategies are now a⁄ected by both governments￿education policies, which also entails
a free rider problem.
3 The open economy
Student mobility provides a potential premium to the standard human capital aq. Studying abroad
also entails costs in terms of adaptation and language learning e⁄orts, and these costs are likely to be
unevenly distributed in the population. We de￿ne a net mobility premium ￿ ￿ U [￿(1 ￿ m)s￿;ms￿]
obtained by mobile students, which is assumed independent of ability a.13 Even if the mobility gain
can be assumed to be strictly positive and constant across the whole population, it is outweighed by
the cost of e⁄ort for a fraction (1 ￿ m) of the population. Under these distributional assumptions,
the joint density of an individual of abilty a and mobility premium ￿ writes h(￿;a) = 1
s￿ ￿ h, where
s￿ de￿nes the length of the support of the marginal distribution of ￿. As will be shown below, the
level of competition between universities is increasing in the marginal number of students they
can attract by raising quality. As a result, the intensity of university competition is a decreasing
function of s￿.
We assume two countries f1;2g of identical population compositions in terms of a and ￿ and
identical unit sizes.
13This parameter corresponds to the concept of multicultural skills that appears in Mechtenberg & Strausz (2008).
In our model, however, this parameter enters the income function additively rather than multiplicatively.
83.1 The ￿rst best
In the open economy, the social planner seeks to maximize ￿1 + ￿2 and makes use of teaching
qualities q1 and q2 and selects the agents who will become skilled, and more precisely, those who
will stay in their origin country and those who will study abroad and bene￿t from the mobility
premium.14 For that matter, we de￿ne e ￿i (a;qi;qj) as the minimal mobility premium required for
an agent from country i with ability a to be sent to study in university j.










Proof. Let us start by looking at the ￿rst order condition with respect to teaching quality qi:
@ (￿1 + ￿2)
@qi
=
@ (W1 + W2)
@qi
￿ ￿cqi = 0;
where W1 + W2 = H1 + H2 is the total stock of human capital produced in both countries. Let us
assume for a moment that the selection of students is the same in both countries. Then, since tech-
nologies and population composition of both countries are identical, the marginal bene￿t
@(W1+W2)
@qi
is the same in both countries, so that marginal costs should be equalized, which implies that
qFB
1 = qFB
2 . Let us now analyze the selection of students. As in the case of autarky, it is so-
cially desirable that all students enroll in university. However, it may be preferable to educate some
agents in the foreign country. This will be the case for those such that aqFB
j + ￿ > aqFB







. This implies that if qFB
i = qFB
j , the minimal mobility premium to be sent in
the foreign university is e ￿FB
1 = e ￿FB
2 = 0. Summing up, posing identical student selection implies
identical teaching quality qFB in both countries, and in turn, identical teaching quality implies
identical student selection for both countries. In other words, we have just shown that a symmetric
￿rst best allocation exists, with e ￿FB = 0. It just remains to show which is the optimal level of
teaching quality qFB. Using symmetry, the planner￿ s objective writes
￿1 + ￿2 = 2(W + ￿R);
















The ￿rst best level of q is therefore such that
1
2
￿ ￿qFBc = 0;
14Note that at the ￿rst best allocation, the location of skilled workers is irrelevant since the planner cares about
the total stock of human capital formed independently of its location. Worker mobility will be speci￿ed in the non-







RFB = B ￿
1
8c￿2:
Let us now turn to the non-cooperative analysis, which we decompose into two parts, one with
a single government in order to isolate the competition e⁄ect of universities, and one with two
governments, which adds the free-rider problem between the latter.
3.2 The non-cooperative game with a single government
This subsection can be considered as the case of a single governmental entity, such as the European
Commission, de￿ning the same public ￿nance policy to all its member states￿universities. There
are therefore three types of players, namely the governmental entity, the two universities and the
agents of both countries. The timing of the non-cooperative game is the following. First, the public
decision-maker de￿nes the funding schemes fG1;g1;G2;g2g. Second, universities of country 1 and 2
simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose their level of education quality q1 and q2 respectively.
Third, students from each country choose an education quality, and therefore select a location for
their studies.15
Proposition 4 The non cooperative equilibrium with a single government reaches the ￿rst best
allocation. Student mobility creates a positive competition e⁄ect in terms of teaching quality. The
Nash equilibrium between universities shows that the teaching quality of one university is increasing
in its own funding per student, and decreasing in that of the other university.
Proof. We solve the model backwards. At the last stage of the game, agents have to decide where
to study. An agent from country i has income yii if he/she studies in i and yij if he/she studies in
j, where
yii = aqi
yij = aqj + ￿:
The decision to study abroad is therefore taken if and only if the mobility premium is large enough:
yij > yii () ￿ > ￿ij ￿ (qi ￿ qj)a: (3)
In other words, ￿ij is the minimal mobility premium of agents from country i who decide to study
in university j.
15Note that, as in the ￿rst best analysis, the location of skilled workers is irrelevant for a single government. In order
to simplify the presentation, worker mobility will be speci￿ed in the non-cooperative game with two governements.
10Let us now analyze the stage of university competition. In order to address the question of how
universities compete, let us ￿rst describe how teaching qualities of both countries q1 and q2 a⁄ect
the demand for education in each country. From the students￿rule of location decision shown in
(3), we can write the number of agents from i studying in their origin country, nii, and the number















The total number of agents studying in university i is therefore
ni = nii + nji = 1 +
1
s￿
(qi ￿ qj): (4)
Quite intuitively, the demand for education in university i is increasing in the latter￿ s quality, and
decreasing in university j￿ s quality. It can also be noted that 1=s￿ measures the constant slope of
ni with respect to qi. The lower s￿, the higher the sensitivity of demand with respect to the quality
di⁄erential. A low s￿ corresponds to a high value for the density of ￿, meaning that, if university
i raises quality at the margin, it attracts a larger mass of additional students. It follows that s￿ is
inversely related to the competition level.
Using similar index notations, the aggregate stock of human capital produced by university i is
noted:
Hi = Hii + Hji;















The stock of human capital created with mobile students takes account of the mobility premium.







































Making use of (4) and (5), the objective of the universities is given by
Ui = Hi + ￿
￿






11University i maximizes Ui with respect to qi, considering university j￿ s strategy as given. University
i￿ s reaction function writes
q￿
i (qj;gi) =
￿gi ￿ qj=3 + s￿=2
s￿￿c ￿ 1
: (6)
Education qualities chosen by the universities are strategic substitutes if and only if s￿￿c > 1.
This condition is precisely the condition under which the maximization problem of the university















￿ ￿c < 0:
The cost of quality decreases the amount of money invested in research. This cost is convex. How-
ever, the introduction of competition for students makes Hi, the stock of human capital produced
by university i, also convex in qi. Indeed, while the stock mechanically increases with hi, a higher
quality level also attracts additional students under student mobility. The combination of these two
e⁄ects generates a convex gain. The above mentioned condition ensures that the cost side increases
in h faster than the gain side. It is satis￿ed as soon as the cost parameter c and/or the preference
for research ￿ are high enough, or if 1
s￿ is low enough. This last condition is due to the following
mechanism. The second derivative of Hi with respect to qi is precisely 1
s￿, which is the joint density
h(a;￿), and is also equal to @ni
@qi , the marginal number of students a university can attract by raising
its quality. If 1
s￿ is low, this means that the bene￿ts from competition are limited, so that costs
from competition will grow faster than its bene￿ts. We assume that this condition, which only relies
on parameters, is satis￿ed.
Combining both universities￿reaction functions, one obtains the Nash equilibrium between univer-
sities:
qN
i (gi;gj) = ￿
￿
















In order to assess the e⁄ect of the funding per student of both governments gi and gj, let us analyze
￿ and ￿. Since we assumed that s￿￿c > 1 (otherwise the best response functions we formulated
in the quality game would not be valid), we know that ￿ > 0. It is straightforward to show that
￿ < 0 for 1 < s￿￿c < 4
3 and ￿ > 1 for s￿￿c > 4
3. Therefore, we face here two distinct cases.
The ￿rst one, in which s￿￿c > 4
3 is quite natural and intuitive. Indeed, in this case, the quality








@gj = ￿(￿ ￿ 1)￿ < 0). The second case (1 < s￿￿c < 4
3) is clearly less intutitive, since
12the e⁄ects of subsidies are reversed: the quality o⁄ered by university i is decreasing in the funding
per student it receives from its government, whereas this quality is increasing in the funding per
student that its competitor receives:
@qN
i
@gi = ￿￿ < 0 and
@qN
i
@gj = ￿(￿ ￿ 1)￿ > 0.
These two di⁄erent cases have naturally di⁄erent repercussions on the optimization problem of the
governement. We are going to see indeed that the government can only reach an interior solution
in its funding policy in the ￿rst case, where s￿￿c > 4
3.
Let us therefore analyze the government/social planner￿ s behavior. In particular, the question we
address here is whether a government/principal facing two universities/agents is able to provide
them with the right incentives so as to obtain the ￿rst best allocation. The objective of the social
planner depends on the aggregate stock of human capital and on the aggregate research budget:
￿ = U1 + U2 = W1 + W2 + ￿(R1 + R2); (8)
where W1 + W2 = H1 + H2, which are obtained from the combination of (5) and (7). Also, using
(4) and (7), and the government￿ s budget constraint (1),































2 ￿ 12c￿s￿ + 2
￿
s￿ (3c￿s￿ ￿ 2)
2 (3c￿s￿ ￿ 4)
:
Before interpreting the ￿rst order condition, let us discuss the second order condition, which is
basically on condition on c￿s￿. Under the set of relevant values of c￿s￿ for an the interior solution
of the quality game under consideration here (that is, c￿s￿ > 1), the second order condition is not
satis￿ed in the interval ]1:138;4=3[, and is satis￿ed everywhere else.16 We therefore focus on the
￿rst case described above (c￿s￿ > 4=3), which is both intuitive in terms of the impacts of subsidies
on the Nash equilibrium qualities and also validates the second order condition of universities.
































Since university competition creates an incentive for universities to raise teaching quality to
attract students, and since the higher the subsidies, the larger this incentive, the government must
o⁄er a large ￿xed subsidy G and "tax" universities for their students (g￿ < 0). This result of a
negative per student subsidy may seem, at ￿rst sight, unrealistic. It can be understood in the light
of two arguments. First, teaching costs are assumed independent of the number of students. If costs
were a⁄ected by the number of students, the overinvestment problem would be less important, and
governments should also contribute to these costs through g. Second, we have assumed that the
parameter ￿ was identical between governments and universities. It could be realistic to assume
that universities are more oriented towards research, in which case ￿U > ￿G. Under this alternative
assumption, the teaching activity is essentially a way for universities to collect public funds to
￿nance research. It follows that, in order to provide universities with incentives to o⁄er education
quality thereby producing the desirable stock of human capital, the government has to subsidize




3cs￿ (￿U ￿ ￿G) ￿ 2
6c￿￿G




3.3 The non-cooperative game with two governments
This subsection introduces the game between governments. An important feature of the case with
two governments is the workers￿location decision. Indeed, governments are interested in the stock
of human capital that eventually works on its soil. Let ! ￿ U [￿(1 ￿ o);o] represent the agents￿
preferences for living/working in their country of origin. This means that ceteris paribus, a fraction
o of the population prefers to settle in its country of origin. These preferences are independent
of ability and mobility premia.17 The timing of the non-cooperative game is the same as in the
previous subsection, except for two things. First, in the ￿rst period, two governments are competing.
Second, the game has one more period, in which the skilled agent chooses his location decision.
Proposition 5 The non cooperative game with two governments results in underinvestment in
teaching quality and suboptimal human capital production. The positive university competition e⁄ect
17This extremely simple modeling strategy will be enriched in subsection 3.5 when taxes will be introduced, so that
worker mobility and the government￿ s budget will be made endogenous.
14is dominated by the government free-rider e⁄ect. The degree of ine¢ ciency of the non-cooperative
equilibrium is increasing in the number of agents who leave the country in which they studied.
Proof. We solve the model backwards. At the last stage of the game, agents have to decide where
to work. Since at this stage, incomes are given and depend only on the human capital acquired and
not on the work location, an agent will choose to work in his/her country of origin if y+! > y, that
is, ! > 0. The proportion of agents working in their country of origin is therefore o. It follows from
the assumption of independence that such a proportion applies to every ability level and wherever
the agents studied.
The next two stages to be studied are that of student participation and mobility choices and that
of university competition. The analysis of these two stages is identical to the previous subsection.
We can therefore focus on the government game. Each government implements non-cooperatively
its funding scheme fGi;gig so as to maximize the production of its own economy,
￿i = Wi + ￿Ri;
where, taking account of worker mobility,
Wi = o(Hii + Hij) + (1 ￿ o)(Hjj + Hji);
and, taking account of the budget constraint,

































(￿ ￿ 1) = ￿cqi￿:
The previous equation shows that government i equalizes the marginal bene￿ts of gi to its marginal
cost. The marginal bene￿ts of gi are twofold. On the one hand, it creates an incentive for university
i to raise its teaching quality, and therefore Wi, and on the other hand, it deters university j from
investing in qN
j , which also increases Wi. Combining both governments￿reaction function, one














￿ = 2(1 ￿ o)(1 ￿ m) + o ￿ (1 ￿ m) (10)
2 [0;1]:
18It can be shown that the government￿ s second order condition is satis￿ed if and only if s￿￿c > 4=3.






















This expression implies that, with two governments, the non-cooperative equilibrium level of teach-









2￿c since s￿￿c > 4=3 and ￿ ￿ 0.
The ine¢ ciency of the non-cooperative allocation captured by ￿ is represented graphically in



















Figure 1: Ine¢ ciency of the non cooperative solution as a function of o and m.
cases where the non-cooperative outcome is e¢ cient, which are fo = 0;m = 1g and fo = 1;m = 0g.
The ￿rst case is such that all agents study abroad (since they all have positive mobility premia)
and prefer to live and work in the foreign country as well (since o = 0). The second case can be
seen as autarky, in which all agents study in their country of origin and prefer to live and work in
their country of origin as well. In both cases, there is no problem of governments free-riding on
public goods since the population of agents studying in one country is the same as the population
working in this same country. The other two extreme cases, where the ine¢ ciency is maximal, are
either when all agents have positive mobility premia but prefer to work in their origin country,
or when all agents have negative mobility premia but prefer to work abroad. In these two cases,
the government￿ s free-riding problem is maximal, since all agents studying in country i go to work
in country j. The degree of ine¢ ciency of the non-cooperative outcome is in fact embodied in ￿
de￿ned in equation (10). More precisely, ￿ represents the extent to which the higher education
problem has public good characteristics. The following section shows that the correcting public
policy is more subtle than usually acknowledged.
163.4 University and government competition with a regulator
In this subsection, a supranational authority imposes transfers between governments for the funding
of mobile students. Indeed, up to now, local governments were ￿nancing the studies of foreign
students. The question we address in this subsection is whether a transfer between governments
per mobile student can lead to the ￿rst best allocation. For that matter, we introduce an additional
player, called the supranational authority, who plays before governments and imposes government
j to make a transfer b to government i for each student originating from j who studies in i.
The only remarkable change in the subsequent periods pertains to government i￿ s budget con-
straint, which now writes
B + (nji ￿ nij)b = Gi + nigi;
where the budget is made endogenous by the addition of a second term which measures the aggregate
monetary ￿ ow from country j to country i. Since all subsequent stages of the game are unchanged,
we study the government game while taking this modi￿cation into account. The Nash equilibrium



















The transfer between governments creates an incentive for governments to raise funding per student
and therefore teaching quality of their university. The supranational authority can therefore set a
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The optimal transnational transfer is increasing in ￿, re￿ ecting the fact that, the more the problem
looks like a public good setting, the more the origin country has to support the costs of its mobile
students. An important result is that this function is continuous. In other words, the correcting
public policy has to be adapted to the degree of mobility of both students and workers, indicating
that the supranational entity may have to collect information about mobility before implementing
a potential intervention. For instance, an excessive level of the transnational transfer would yield
overinvestment in teaching quality at equilibrium.
173.5 Endogenizing worker mobility and government budgets with ￿scal compe-
tition
In this ￿nal subsection, governments have a second decision variable in the ￿rst stage. Not only do
they de￿ne the funding policy of universities, but they also set the tax levels they impose on the
workers who settle on their soil. This additional decision variable considerably enriches the model
by adding two crucial features. First, this ￿scal competition is aimed at attracting skilled labor,
making worker mobility endogenous. Second, taxes make the government￿ s budget endogenous,
which implies that governments willing to attract more skilled labor face the risk of lowering their
￿scal revenues, which will impact university funding. Formally, the government game therefore
becomes a simultaneous game in which both players have two decision variables, namely gi and ti.
As will be shown further, the government￿ s budget and objective will be a⁄ected by this change.
Indeed, this objective depends on the human capital working on its soil, and worker mobility is
a⁄ected by taxation. To see this, let us analyze the last stage of the game. At this stage, incomes
are given and depend only on the human capital acquired and not on the work location, an agent
will choose to work in his/her country of origin if y ￿ ti + ! > y ￿ tj, that is, ! > ti ￿ tj. The
proportion of agents working in their country of origin is therefore
pi = o ￿ ti + tj:
As in the previous sections, this proportion applies to every ability level and wherever the agents
studied. Therefore, the next two stages to be studied (student location and university competition)
are not a⁄ected by this. We can therefore focus on the government game. Each government imple-
ments non-cooperatively its funding scheme and its taxation scheme fGi;gi;tig so as to maximize
the production of its own economy,
￿i = Wi + ￿Ri;
where, taking account of worker mobility,
Wi = pi (Hii + Hij) + (1 ￿ pi)(Hjj + Hji);
and, taking account of the budget constraint,





Each government has two reaction functions, which are determined by @￿i
@gi = 0 and @￿i
@ti = 0. It can
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18This symmetry result in terms of taxation is very important because the rest of the problem now
boils down to the problem with exogenous taxation. Indeed, we have that pi = o as under exogenous
worker mobility, and the budget is back to the form derived in subsection 3.4. The combination
of the governments￿reaction functions with respect to gi and gj therefore yields the same results
as before. In other words, tax competition and endogenous worker mobility do not mitigate nor
aggravate the free-riding problem of governments.
Using the symmetry gNb
i = gNb
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Making use of gNb and b￿, one obtains that
tN
i = tN














Note that equilibrium taxes are decreasing in HFB=￿. In other words, ￿scal competition is more
likely to be ￿erce if skilled labor is too valuable relative to research, which gives governments an
incentive to attract skilled workers at the expense of research. This will be the case if mobility
premia are frequent (m large), costs of producing human capital (c) are low, and the relative
productivity of research (￿) is low. It is important to note that, even with endogenous taxes, the
application of the correcting policy b￿ enables the regulator to reach the ￿rst best level of human
capital. However, under ￿scal competition, a high level of human capital fosters ￿scal competition
and leads to underprovision of funds allocated to research. With ￿scal competition, there is therefore
a tradeo⁄ between e¢ ciencies in education and research and a potential underinvestment in both
activities. The transnational entity should therefore tackle both the free-riding problem of university
funding and the ￿scal competition problem.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we addressed the question of the impact of student and worker cross-country mobility
on human capital production and research. We highlight an important implication of this mobility
on the divergence between governments and universities￿objectives. Indeed, universities care about
prestige and the stock of human capital produced independently of its future location, whereas
governments are not willing to ￿nance the education of agents who will leave the country afterwards.
Since governments are the ￿rst players of this game, the free-rider e⁄ect between governments
19dominates the competition e⁄ect between universities induced by student mobility. A positive
transnational transfer made by the government of the country sending students abroad to the
recipient country allows to correct this ine¢ ciency. When government budgets and worker mobility
are made endogenous with tax competition, the e¢ cient level of teaching quality can be o⁄ered by
universities, but may fail to prevent governments from engaging in ￿scal competition with, as a
result, a potential underinvestment in both teaching and research.
The model presented in this paper integrates many important features of this literature, such
as student and worker mobility, quality competition by universities, university funding and ￿scal
competition by governments. From a technical viewpoint, this model is quite original in that it
provides a non-cooperative solution to a game between two principals (governments) competing by
designing incentives schemes for two competing agents (universities), who themselves rely on a third
layer of players (the students). Still, the model does not allow for the possibility for universities
to compete simultaneously in quality and prices, which are assumed to be zero. In the european
context, this is an acceptable approximation, although integrating tuition fees into the analysis
would be an interesting avenue for future research.
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